A failure-centered synthesis of coalition, coercive, institutional, and continuity mechanisms.
The corpus gives failure mechanisms disproportionate weight because successful revolutionary cases are easier to remember. Large movements can fail when security institutions remain cohesive, services continue, courts and elections retain credibility, governing coalitions do not disaggregate, business and labor favor normalization, or the movement itself fragments around costs and concessions.
Governments do not need to eliminate dissent to survive. They need enough administrative, fiscal, coercive, judicial, and electoral capacity to keep the constitutional order functioning while political bargaining continues.
Breadth initially creates leverage but also creates more potential settlement points. Sectoral concessions, elections, leadership changes, legal review, and fatigue can peel away constituencies without satisfying maximal demands.
Even a small violent flank can alter public attribution and state response. The research does not assume violence guarantees failure, but it treats movement discipline and public blame as major mediators.
Use these findings as mechanism-level synthesis. Historical cases are not templates, scenario ranges are not forecasts, and present-tense legal or institutional claims require current verification.